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1 Introduction
The literature has studied preference and capacity manipulation separately and has thus
overlooked the interaction between the two. However, many hiring and admission proce-
dures allow firms, hospitals or schools to state the number of their vacant positions be-
fore candidates are assigned. This creates a possibility of capacity manipulation before the
matching process starts. Furthermore, ex-ante manipulation does not prevent agents from
misrepresenting their preferences during the matching process. In this paper, we present
a many-to-one matching model that allows for both capacity and preference manipulation.
Our objective is to understand whether a mechanism that includes a capacity reporting stage
can implement stable allocations.
Indeed, it is a widespread opinion that markets producing stable outcomes are more suc-
cessful than those that do not (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990 and Roth, 2002). We begin
our analysis isolating the strategic options at work in our settings. As a preliminary step
we concentrate solely on capacity manipulation. We focus on the Nash equilibrium (NE) of
capacity reporting games. First, we provide an equivalence result: theNE of capacity report-
ing games are stable if and only if the stable rule used is immune to capacity manipulation.
Second, we provide conditions under which capacity reporting games yield stable matchings
at the NE. For this reason, we introduce the concept that the agents’ preferences are acycli-
cal. A cycle in the preferences of hospitals (interns) occurs when there is an alternating
list of hospitals and interns “on a circle” such that every hospital (intern) prefers the intern
(hospital) on its clockwise side to the intern (hospital) on its counterclockwise side and finds
both acceptable. We say that preferences are acyclical if they have no cycles. Also, we say
that a group of agents form a simultaneous cycle if they form a cycle both in the preferences
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of interns and hospitals. Acyclicity holds, in particular, when the preferences of the agents
on one side of the market are aligned. We prove that an absence of simultaneous cycles in
the preferences of the agents guarantees the stability of the NE of capacity reporting games,
when any stable rule is used.
In addition, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the stability of the NE
when the hospital-optimal stable rule is employed. However, acyclicity is not necessary for
the stability of NE outcomes under the intern-optimal stable rule. Thus, the intern-optimal
stable rule is less prone to capacity manipulation than the hospital-optimal stable rule. We
prove that the capacity reporting game can produce unstableNE if and only if the preferences
of the hospitals satisfy a complex cycle condition. First, the preferences of the hospitals must
be non-monotonic in population. Then, the cycles in the preferences of hospitals must be
chained in a particular way. These findings extend the results of Konishi and Ünver (2006)
and are related to the work of Kesten (2010).
Third, we proceed to study what we call generalized games of capacity manipulation
(GGCM). GGCM are two-stage extensive form games. In the first stage, each hospital
states its capacity. In the second stage, the agents play a general assignment game. We
do not specify a particular assignment game, but we consider two classes of mechanisms:
revelation stable and non-revelation stable mechanisms.
In stable revelation mechanisms, agents are asked to submit their preferences, and stable
matching is then implemented. This kind of mechanism has been successfully used in practice
(see, for instance, Roth and Sotomayor, 1990 and Roth, 2002) but is manipulable thorough
the misrepresentation of both preferences (see Dubins and Freedman, 1988) and capacities
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(Sönmez, 1997).1 Provided that the preferences of the interns are acyclical, we prove that
the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies produces a stable matching if the
intern-optimal stable rule is employed. Additionally, when the preferences of the hospitals
are known, any stable rule produces stable allocations if the preferences of the agents do not
have simultaneous cycles.
A stable non-revelation mechanism is any sequential game of complete information, such
that the interaction of agents leads to stable allocations with respect to the stated capacities
(some examples of non-revelation stable mechanisms are presented in Kara and Sönmez, 1997;
Alcalde and Romero-Medina, 2000; and Sotomayor, 2003). We show that there is no family of
such games that implements stable matchings at every Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE).
However, if only acyclical preferences are allowed, any non-revelation mechanism implements
stable allocations.
1.1 Related literature
The issue of preference manipulation has been widely discussed in the literature. Roth and
Sotomayor (1990) present detailed references. Additionally, most of the mechanisms that
scholars, such as Kara and Sönmez (1997) or Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000), have
introduced to implement stable allocations in matching markets do not include a capacity
reporting stage.
Capacity manipulation has been studied in isolation as well. Sönmez (1997) demostrates
that every stable revelation mechanism is prone to manipulation via capacities. Konishi
and Ünver (2006) present the conditions under which capacity revelation games have pure-
1Under-reporting of capacities was a source of major concern in the school choice program in NYC before
it was redesigned (see Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005).
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strategy NE , and show that under the assumption of common preferences, truthful capacity
reporting is a dominant strategy for colleges. Mumcu and Saglam (2009) consider sequen-
tial capacity allocation under an assumption of common preferences. Kesten (2010) studies
capacity manipulation of the intern-optimal stable rule and the top-trading cycle rule in
school admission problems. Kesten’s (2010) result proves that if a particular acyclicity con-
dition holds, the intern-optimal stable matching is not manipulable via capacities. Finally,
Ehlers (2010) relates capacity manipulation to two forms of preference manipulation.2 To
our knowledge, the only paper that considers both capacity and preference manipulation is
Kojima and Pathak (2008). They find that the intern-optimal stable matching leaves little
room for manipulation in large markets.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 studies
capacity manipulation, and Section 4 extends our analysis to generalized capacity manipu-
lation games. Finally, Section 5 concludes. The proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 The model
There are two disjoint sets of agents, a set of interns I = (i1, ..., in) and a set of hospitals
H = (h1, ..., hm). Generic agents from the two sets are denoted, respectively, i and h, whereas
a generic agent is denoted by x ∈ H ∪ I. Hospitals hire a set of interns, and interns train in
no more than one hospital. Each hospital has a capacity qh ≥ 1, this capacity denotes the
maximum number of interns that hospital h can accept. Each intern i ∈ I has a complete,
transitive and strict preference ordering Pi over the set of hospitals H ∪ {i}. Let Ri be the
weak preference relation associated with Pi. Each hospital h ∈ H has a complete, strict and
2Se also Kojima (2007).
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transitive preference ordering Ph over the set of interns I ∪ {h}. Similarly, Rh denotes the
weak preference relation associated with Ph. Let PI = (Pi1 , ..., Pin) be the preference profile
of interns over hospitals and let PH = (Ph1 , ..., Phm) be the preference profile of hospitals
over subsets of interns. The quadruple (H, I, q, P ), where P = (PH , PI) and q = (q1, ..., qm)
is a hospital-intern market. The problem consists of matching hospitals with subsets of
interns, allowing for the possibility that some agents remain unmatched.
Let I ′ ⊆ I be a subset of interns. The best group of interns for hospital h among those
belonging to I ′ is called the choice set from I ′ and is denoted by Chh(I ′, Ph) or Chf (I ′)
when no ambiguity is possible. Formally, Chh(I ′, Pi) = argmaxPh {I ′′ : I ′′ ⊆ I ′}. Let i ∈ I
be an intern. If ∅Phi, hospital h prefers not to employ any intern rather than employing i.
In this case, i is unacceptable to h.3 Otherwise, i is acceptable to h. A (h) denotes the
set of interns who are individually acceptable to h. Similarly, for every intern i ∈ I, Pi is a
strict preference order defined on H ∪ {i}. Any hospital h such that iPih is unacceptable
to i. Otherwise, h is acceptable to i. A (i) denotes the set of hospitals that are acceptable
to i.
We assume that the preferences of the hospitals over sets of interns are responsive with
respect to their preferences over individual interns. A hospital h has responsive preferences
if for any two assignments that differ in only one intern, it prefers the assignment containing
the most preferred intern. Formally, Ph is responsive if for all I ′ ⊂ I and for all interns
i, i′ ∈ I: (1) I ′ ∪ {i}PhI ′ ∪ {i′} ⇔ iPhi′ and (2) I ′ ∪ {i}PhI ′ ⇔ i ∈ A (h). We say that a
hospital h has strong monotonic preferences if it prefers a group of acceptable interns
of larger cardinality to sets of acceptable interns of smaller cardinality. Formally, for all
3For all i, i′ ∈ I iPhi′, iPh∅ and ∅Phi denote {i}Ph {i′}, {i}Ph∅ and ∅Ph {i}, respectively.
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J,K ⊂ A (h), |J | > |K|⇒ JPhK.4
A matching on (H, I, q, P ) is a function µ : H ∪ I → 2I ∪ H such that, for every
(h, i) ∈ H × I: (1) µ(h) ∈ 2I , (2) µ(i) ∈ H ∪ {i}, (3) µ(i) = h ⇔ i ∈ µ(h), and (4)
|µ (h)| ≤ qh . Let Mq be the set of matchings on (H, I, q, P ). In words, a matching is an
assignment of interns to hospitals such that no intern is hired by more than one hospital and
no hospital hires more interns than its capacity.
A matching µ is individually rational if (1) µ(h) ⊆ A (h) for all h ∈ H, and (2)
µ(i) ∈ A (i) for all i ∈ I. In words, a matching is individually rational if each hospital is
assigned acceptable interns and every intern prefers to join her assigned hospital rather than
stay unemployed. A matching µ is blocked by the pair (h, i) ∈ H×I if (1) hPiµ(i) and (2)
i ∈ Chi (µ(h) ∪ {i}). A matching µ is stable in (H, I, q, P ) if it is individually rational and
no pair blocks it. Therefore, a hospital-intern pair (h, i) blocks a matching µ if an intern i
prefers joining a hospital h over her match or not being matched at all and hospital h prefers
i to one of its interns or leaving a position vacant. Otherwise, µ is unstable. Γ(H, I, q, P )
denotes the stable set, the set of matchings that are stable in market (H, I, q, P ). If the
hospitals have responsive preferences, the stable set is not empty. There is a stable matching,
which is the hospital-optimal stable matching that is (weakly) preferred to any other
stable matching by every hospital. Another stable matching, the intern-optimal stable
matching, is (weakly) preferred to any other stable matching by every intern. The hospital-
optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) generates the hospital-
optimal stable matching of (H, I, q, P ), and the intern-optimal deferred acceptance
algorithm generates the intern-optimal stable matching of (H, I, q, P ). The hospital-optimal
4The symbol |X| denotes the cardinality of the set X.
7
and the intern-optimal stable matchings of (H, I, q, P ) are denoted by ϕH (H, I, q, P ) and
ϕI (H, I, q, P ), respectively. When there is no ambiguity, ϕH (q) and ϕI (q) are used instead
of ϕH (H, I, q, P ) and ϕI (H, I, q, P ), respectively. Finally, we denote by ϕ (q) any stable
matching of market (H, I, q, P ), and we call the function ϕ a stable rule.
Let ϕ be a stable rule. In a capacity reporting game, each hospital h simultaneously reports
a capacity qh, and the outcome is determined according to ϕ. Interns are passive players,
and information is complete. The capacity reporting game induced by ϕ is a normal form
game of complete information. The set of players is H, and the strategy space of hospital
h is Q (qh) = {1, ..., qh}(see also Hurwicz et al., 1995). The outcome function is ϕ. The
preferences of hospitals over outcomes are generated by their preferences over the subsets of
interns. Finally, a mechanism or rule is manipulable via capacities if there is a hospital that is
strictly better off by under-reporting its capacity. Formally, the mechanism ϕ is manipulable
by capacities at (q, P ) if there exists h ∈ H and q′h < qh such that ϕ (q′h, q−h)Phϕ (q).
3 A look at Nash equilibria
In this section, we concentrate on the stability of NE outcomes of capacity reporting games.
The objective is to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence
and the stability of pure strategy NE.
Konishi and Ünver (2006) devote their attention to discovering sufficient conditions for
the existence of pure strategy NE in capacity reporting games. They also prove that under
the assumption of common preferences, stating the true capacities is a dominant strategy for
hospitals.
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Our first result links the stability of NE outcomes and capacity manipulation.
Lemma 1 Let V ∈ {H, I}. Let q be a NE of the capacity revelation game induced by ϕV at
(H, I, q∗, P ). If h belongs to a pair blocking ϕV (q) in (H, I, q∗, P ), then ϕVh (q)PhϕV (q∗h, q−h).
Lemma 1 shows that if a NE produces an unstable matching, then any hospital belonging
to some blocking pair is strictly better off by manipulating its capacity. We employ this result
throughout the paper.
3.1 The hospital-optimal rule
The literature on capacity reporting games has devoted attention to the property of strong
monotonicity. Every counterexample in Konishi and Ünver (2006) and in Sönmez (1997)
uses preferences that are not strongly monotonic. Strong monotonicity is intuitively linked
to capacity manipulation. However, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the stability of
NE outcomes, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 1 Consider the following 2×2 problem. The preferences of the hospital are strongly
monotonic: Ph1 : {i1, i2} , {i1} , {i2} and Ph2 : {i1, i2} , {i2} , {i1}. The preferences of the
interns are Pi1 : h2, h1 and Pi2 : h1, h2. When the capacities are (2, 2) , (1, 2) or (2, 1), the
unique stable matching is
µ1 =
h1 h2
{i2} {i1}
.
Where
h1
{i2}
denotes that µ1(h1) = i2. When the capacities are (1, 1) the matching µ1 is
the intern-optimal stable matching. The hospital-optimal stable matching is:
9
µ2 =
h1 h2
{i1} {i2}
.
When the capacities are (2, 2) the capacity revelation game induced by ϕH has two NE,
(1, 1) and (2, 2). The former yields µ2 as an outcome, which is blocked by the pair (h1, i2).
The latter yields µ1 as an outcome.
When the hospitals state their true capacities, the interns receive offers from both hospi-
tals, along the deferred acceptance algorithm. Each intern can choose her favorite hospital,
and every hospital ends up hiring its least-preferred intern. However, both hospitals would
be willing to switch their interns because there is a “cycle” in their preferences: i1Ph1i2Ph2i1.
This can be accomplished if both hospitals understate their capacity. In this way, each hospi-
tal only makes an offer to its favorite intern. Every intern accepts her unique offer and each
hospital ends up hiring its favorite intern. Notice that this possibility arises because there is
also a “cycle” in the preferences of the interns, which moves in the opposite direction of the
cycle in the preferences of the hospitals: h2Pi1h1Pi2h2.
The findings of Example 1 are intrinsic to capacity manipulation. It is the presence of
simultaneous cycles of preferences that allows for the posibility of capacity manipulation
under the hospital-optimal rule.
In general, a cycle in the preferences of the hospitals arises when there is a list of hospitals
and interns alternating “on a circle” such that every hospital in the cycle prefers the intern
on its clockwise side to the intern on its counterclockwise side but finds both acceptable. We
present this concept formally in the following definitions.
Definition 1 A hospitals’ cycle (of length T + 1) is given by h0, ..., hT with hl ,= hl+1
for i = 0, ..., T and distinct i0, i1, ..., iT such that:
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1. i0Ph0iTPhT iT−1....i1Ph1i0,
2. for every l, il+1 ∈ A (hl) ∩ A (hl+1).5
The preferences of the hospitals are acyclical if they have no cycles of any length.
Assume that a cycle exists. If every il is initially assigned to hl+1, every hospital is
willing to exchange its assigned intern with its successor. If the preferences are acyclical,
in particular, there are no cycles of length two. Thus, each pair of hospitals have the same
preferences over the set of mutually acceptable interns. Therefore, the notion of acyclicity
generalizes the notion of common preferences presented by Konishi and Ünver (2006).
The notion of a cycle in the preferences of interns’ preference is specular.
Definition 2 An interns’ cycle (of length T + 1) is given by h0, ..., hT and i0, i1, ..., iT
such that:
1. h0PiThTPiT−1hT−1....h1Pi0h0,
2. for every l, hl ∈ A (il−1) ∩ A (il).
The preferences of the interns are acyclical if they have no cycles of any length.
A simultaneous cycle arises when there is a list of hospitals and interns alternating “on a
circle” such that every hospital (intern) prefers the intern (hospital) on its clockwise side to
the intern (hospital) on its counterclockwise side but finds both acceptable. Formally:
Definition 3 A simultaneous cycle is a set of hospitals h0, ..., hT and students i0, i1, ..., iT
forming a cycle both in the preferences of the interns and the hospitals.
5From now on, indices are considered modulo T + 1.
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A simultaneous cycle naturally defines two “partial-matchings” µ1 and µ2 where µ1 (it) =
ht and µ2 (it) = ht+1. Every hospital in the cycle prefers µ1 and every intern in the cycle
prefers µ2. The intuition developed in Example 1 helps to state the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let V ∈ {H, I}. If ϕVh (q)PhϕV (q∗h, q−h) for some h and some qh < q∗h, then there
exists a simultaneous cycle.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that if no simultaneous cycle exists, stating the true
capacities is a dominant strategy for hospitals in both the hospital and the intern-optimal
stable matchings. From Proposition 1 in Romero-Medina and Triossi (2011), it follows that
this result extends to any stable rule.
Proposition 1 Assume that no simultaneous cycle exists and let ϕ be any stable rule. Then,
(1) Stating the true capacities is a dominant strategy under ϕ for every q.
(2) For each q, the capacity revelation games induced by ϕ have a unique NE: the unique
stable matching of (H, I, q, P ).
In particular, the result holds when either the preferences of the hospitals or the prefer-
ences of the interns are acyclical and generalizes Theorems 6 and 7 in Konishi and Ünver
(2006). Actually, acyclicity is the weakest condition that guarantees that stating the true
capacities is a dominant strategy and that every NE yields a stable matching under the
hospital-optimal stable rule.
Proposition 2 Assume that the preferences of the hospitals (interns) have a cycle. Then,
there exists a preferences profile for the interns (hospitals) and a vector of capacities q such
that the capacity reporting game induced by ϕH yields an unstable matching at equilibrium at
(H, I, q, P ).
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From Propositions 1 and 2 it follows that the hospital-optimal stable matching is manipu-
lable via capacity under relatively weak conditions. Indeed, assume that all interns (hospital)
are acceptable to every hospital (intern). In this case, assuming acyclicity is equivalent to
the assumption that all hospitals (interns) have the same preferences on individual interns
(on hospitals) (see Triossi and Romero Medina 2011).
3.2 The intern-optimal rule
The intern-optimal stable matching makes state their true preferences a dominant strategy for
interns. Furthermore, Kojima and Pathak (2008) find that the intern-optimal stable matching
leaves little room for manipulation in large markets. According to Pathak and Sönmez (2009)
the intern-optimal stable matching is strongly more manipulable via colleges preferences than
the hospital-optimal stable matching. Nevertheless, several matching procedures have been
redesigned to use intern-optimal stable matching. Examples of this include the NRMP and
the school allocation method in Boston.
In the case of manipulation via capacities, the evidence is inconclusive. Roth and Peranson
(1999) observed little evidence of differential manipulability via capacities between the initial
NRMP and the intern-optimal version of the same algorithm. We find that the game induced
by the intern-optimal stable matching is more resistant to capacity manipulation.
First, to include capacity manipulation in the intern-optimal stable matching, at least
three interns are needed. Consider, for instance, a matching market with only two interns
and assume that at least one hospital has a capacity of two. If the two interns are assigned to
one hospital, this hospital cannot benefit from rejecting one of them because the preferences
are responsive. If the interns are assigned to two different hospitals, reducing capacities does
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not affect the outcome of the game.
There is a second and more important difference between the manipulability of the
hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable matchings. Under the hospital-optimal rule, a
hospital that understates capacities refrains from granting admission to some interns in
the deferred acceptance algorithm. In this way, it prevents potential cycles of rejections
of hospitals by interns. Under intern-optimal stable matching the situation is different. By
understating capacities a hospital generates a chain of rejections of interns by hospitals.
Therefore, such a hospital might receive more applications from interns, but it will be able
to fill fewer positions. As we will later prove, a hospital under the intern-optimal rule needs
non-monotonic preferences to profit from capacity manipulation. Notice that if there are
only two interns the capacity revelation game induced by ϕI yields the intern-optimal stable
matching as a NE outcome, in contrast to the case of ϕH . Example 2 provides the basic
intuition that explains how the intern-optimal stable rule can result in unstable matchings.
Example 2 Let I = {i1, i2, i3, i4} , H = {h1, h2}. Let Ph1 be such that Ph1 :{i1, i2, i3} , {i1, i2} ,
{i1, i3} , {i1}, {i2, i3} , {i2}, {i3}, {i4}, and let Ph2 be strongly monotonic in population accord-
ing to the following preference over individual interns Ph2:{i4}, {i3}, {i2}, {i1}. Let Pi1 :
h2, h1, Pi2 : h1, h2, Pi3 : h1, h2, and Pi4 :h2, h1 . When the capacity is (2, 2) the intern-
optimal stable matching is
µ1 =
h1 h2
{i2, i3} {i1, i4}
.
When the capacity is (1, 2) the intern-optimal stable matching is
µ2 =
h1 h2 ∅
{i1} {i3, i4} {i2}
.
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When the capacity is (2, 2) the unique NE under the intern-optimal rule is (1, 2), which
yields an unstable matching, µ2.
In Example 2, if h1 states its true capacity it only receives applications from i2 and i3
and it never receives an application from i1 under the intern-optimal deferred acceptance
algorithm. If h1 understates its capacity, it rejects the application from i3 in the first stage of
the deferred acceptance algorithm. In the second stage of the deferred acceptance algorithm,
i3 applies to h2 and induces the rejection of i1 by h2. Finally, h1 receives an application
from i1 and rejects i2. The non-monotonicity of h1’s preferences is necessary to generate the
instability. The cycle at h1 makes the chain of rejections possible.
Assume that hospital h has capacity qh and fills the qthh position at stage k of the deferred
acceptance algorithm for the first time. Let Ih be the set of interns employed at h at stage
k − 1. Stating capacity qh − 1 can be profitable to h only if some intern i filling the qthh
position applies to hospital h′ and induces a chain of rejections such that some interns must
apply to and be accepted by h. In this situation, h ends up with a new set of interns I ′h with
at most qh−1 interns. If capacity manipulation is profitable, then I ′hPh(Ih∪{i}). Therefore,
the preferences of h must not be strictly monotonic, as |Ih ∪ {i}| > |I ′h|.
We show that, to describe the appropriate chains of rejections, a new notion of cycles is
necessary.
Definition 4 A generalized cycle (of length T +1) at h is given by a cycle in hospital’s
preferences h = h0, ..., hT , i0, i1, ..., iT and by i−1 such that: i0Ph0i−1Ph0iT .
Notice that in Example 2, there is a generalized cycle at h1: i1Ph1 {i2, i3}, i1Ph1i3Ph2i2Ph2i1.
If every hospital finds all interns to be acceptable, any generalized cycle can be reduced to
a generalized cycle of length two (see Ergin, 2002). Assume that a generalized cycle of length
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two at h exists. Let h0 be matched with two interns i−1 and i1. and let h1 be matched with
i0. Assume also that i0Ph0 {i−1, i1}. Hospital h0 would be willing to exchange its two interns
for i0 only and h1 would accept the proposal (potentially only hiring i1). In general, non-
monotonicity in the preferences of the hospitals and the generalized cycles must be connected
in a particular way for capacity manipulation to be profitable under the intern-optimal rule.
Definition 5 A non-monotonic cycle at h is given by M,M ′ ⊆ I, with |M | < |M ′| such
that:
(1) MPhM ′.
(2) Let M \ M ′ = {i1, ..., is}. For k = 1, ..., s there is a generalized cycle at h,
hk0, ..., h
k
Tk , i
k
−1, i
k
0, i
k
1, ..., i
k
Tk , T
k ≥ 1 such that ik = ik0 and ik−1, ikTk ∈M ′ \M .
(3) For k ,= k′, ikl ,= ik′l′ for all l = 0, ...T k, l′ = 0, ...., T k′.
The definition of a non-monotonic cycle is simple but demanding. It links non-monotonicity
with cycles of rejection. It requires that: (1) h prefers some set of interns containing fewer
elements, M , to a set of interns containing more elements, M ′; (2) any intern who belongs
to the set with more interns but not to the one with fewer interns must be the starting point
of a generalized cycle at h, for which the last intern of the cycle and ik−1 belong to the larger
set (M ′) but not to the smaller set (M); and (3) all the cycles in (2) must be disconnected.
The main result of this section weakens the requirements of Proposition 1: the intern-
optimal stable matching is non-manipulable via capacity under relatively weak conditions.
Proposition 3 Assume that no non-monotonic cycle exists. Then:
(1) Stating the true capacities is a dominant strategy under ϕI for every q.
(2) For each q, the capacity revelation game induced by ϕI yields the intern-optimal stable
matching of (H, I, q, P ) at every NE.
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If preferences are strongly monotonic in a population, no non-monotonic cycle exists and
Proposition 3 implies and extends Theorem 5 in Konishi and Ünver (2006), as we formally
state in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Assume that either the preferences of the hospitals are strongly monotonic in
population, that there is no preference cycle of a length larger than two, or that there are
no generalized cycles. Then stating the true capacity is a dominant strategy in the capacity
revelation game induced by ϕI , and the game yields the intern-optimal stable matching at
every NE.
The absence of non-monotonic cycles is the minimal condition required to prevent capacity
manipulation. If a non-monotonic cycle exists, there is a preferences profile for the interns
and a vector of capacities q such that the capacity reporting game yields an unstable matching
in equilibrium. Additionally, if the preferences of the interns have a cycle of length at least
3, there exists a preferences profile for the hospitals and a vector of capacities q such that
the capacity reporting game yields an unstable matching in equilibrium. The same applies
to the preferences profile for those interns with cycles of length less than 3. The following
proposition shows which hospitals might benefit from capacity manipulation.
Proposition 4 Assume that there exists a non-monotonic cycle at h or that the preferences
of the interns have a cycle length at least 3. Then,
(1) There is a preferences profile for the interns and a vector of capacities q such that the
capacity reporting game induced by ϕI yields an unstable matching at equilibrium.
(2) There is a preferences profile for the interns and a vector of capacities q such that
hospital h can manipulate ϕI at (q, P ).
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Notice that Theorem 1 in Kesten (2010) shows that given a vector of capacity and prefer-
ence (q, P ), the intern-optimal stable matching is not manipulable via capacities if and only
if (q, P ) has no cycles. In Kesten (2010) (see also Ergin, 2002), a priority structure contains
a cycle if the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) There is a generalized cycle of length
two h0, h1, i0, i1, i−1. (2) There exist disjoint sets of students Nh0 , Nh1such that iPh0i−1 for
all i ∈ Nh0 , iPh1i0 for all i ∈ Nh1 , |Nh0| = qh0 − 1 and |Nh1| = qh1 − 1. This definition
of a cycle imposes a restriction on capacities that is absent in ours. Furthermore, given a
cycle of length two, there always exists a capacity vector such that condition (2) is satisfied
with Nh0 = Nh1 = ∅ and qh0 = qh1 = 1. Finally, our condition for a non-monotonic cycle in
Definition 5 is more restrictive. It requires the existence of non-monotonic preferences and,
at least, a generalized cycle.6
4 Generalized games of capacity manipulation
In most real life mechanisms, the strategic possibilities of agents go beyond capacity manip-
ulation. For example, after hospitals have revealed their capacities, interns are assigned to
hospitals according to stated preferences (for instance, in the NRMP , the Boston and New
York mechanisms). The game that follows the capacity revelation stage has been modeled
in different ways in the literature (see Alcalde and Romero-Medina, 2000; Abdulkadirog˘lu et
al., 2005 and Sotomayor, 2008). At this stage, both hospitals and interns can manipulate the
outcome by misrepresenting their preferences. We now define a class of games that allows
for the manipulation of both capacities and preferences.
6The example which proves the sufficiency of Kesten’s condition for capacity manipulation includes a
non-monotonic cycle.
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Definition 6 Let (H, I, q, P ) be a hospital-intern market. A generalized game of ca-
pacity manipulation is {Gq′}q′≤q where Gq′ = (H, I,Mq′ , gq′) is a game form. The set
of players is H ∪ I, the strategy space is Mq′ =
∏
i∈I Mq′,i ×
∏
h∈H Mq′,h, and the outcome
function is gq′ : Mq′ →Mq′.
For every q′ ≤ q, Gq′ describes the game played by the agents following the revelation of
a vector of capacities q′.
In the remainder of this section, we consider games where hospitals simultaneously reveal
a capacity q in the first stage, and in the second agents play the game Gq = (H, I,Mq, gq).
We explore both revelation and non-revelation GGCM .
4.1 Revelation games
We assume that the game played after the capacity revelation stage is a revelation game
induced by a stable rule ϕ. Formally, Mq,x = Px for all x ∈ H ∪ I, gq (m) ∈ Γ (H, I, q, P ) for
all q.
It is well known that no stable capacity revelation game makes the revelation of both every
agent’s preferences and capacities a dominant strategy. Therefore, the concept of a dominant
strategy is too demanding for this framework. However, when the intern-optimal stable
matching is used, stating true preferences is always a dominant strategy for interns. From
Proposition 3, we also know that if the interns strategy PI is a vector of acyclic preferences,7
then stating true capacities is a dominant strategy for hospitals. In addition, the following
result holds.
7Notice that acyclicity implies non-monotonic cycles
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Proposition 5 Assume that the preferences of the interns are acyclical. When the intern-
optimal stable rule is used, the unique outcome that survives the iterated elimination of weakly
dominated strategies in the preference-capacity manipulation game is the intern-optimal stable
matching.
An analogous result does not hold when the hospital-optimal stable rule is employed
because truth-telling is not a dominant strategy for any agent.
However, there are situations where the preferences of the hospitals can be taken as
given. This is due, for instance, to institutional constraints. In this case, we can consider
Mq,h = {Ph} for all h ∈ H, Mq,i = Pi for all i ∈ I, and gq (m) ∈ Γ (H, I, q, P ) for all q.
Sotomayor (2008) shows that, when capacities are known, the game induced by the hospital-
optimal rule implements the stable set in NE. However, this is not enough to prevent
capacity manipulation. Only the assumption of acyclicity prevents the implementation of
unstable allocations.
Proposition 6 Let V ∈ {H, I} and let gq (m) = ϕV (P, q) for all q. If the preferences of
either interns or hospitals have no simultaneous cycles, the generalized capacity revelation
games induced by ϕV yield the unique stable matching of (H, I, q, P ) as a SPE outcome.
Proposition 6 follows from Sotomayor (2008) and Proposition 1.
4.2 Non-revelation games
In this section we consider capacity manipulation in non-revelation games. Kara and Sönmez
(1996) prove that the stable set is implementable in NE through a non-revelation game. Al-
calde and Romero-Medina (2000, 2005), Sotomayor (2003), and Romero-Medina and Triossi
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(2010) present extensive form games able to implement the stable set and the intern-optimal
stable matching in SPE.
For the remainder of the section, we assume that every Gq′ is an extensive form game. Let
SPE (Gq´, q′, P ) be the set of SPE outcomes of Gq′ when the capacity-preference vector is
(q′, P ). We assume that SPE (Gq´, q′, P ) ,= ∅ for all q′ and that all such SPE outcomes are
stable with respect to the stated capacities, which are ∅ " SPE (Gq´, q′, P ) ⊆ Γ(H, I, q′, P )
for all q′.8 We call the family {Gq′}q′ , stable.
Even if the family {Gq′}q′ is well behaved, adding a capacity manipulation stage does not
guarantee that the resulting GGCM produces stable matching in every SPE. In fact, the
negative result is even stronger.
Proposition 7 Assume that there are at least two hospitals and three interns. There is no
family of stable non-revelation mechanisms {Gq′}q′ such that the associated game of capacity
manipulation yields stable SPE for all q.
Proof. The proof is by means of an example, based on Sönmez (1997).
LetH ⊇ {h1, h2} and let I ⊇ {i1, i2, i3}. Let P h1 : {i1, i2, i3}, {i1, i2}, {i1, i3}, {i1}, {i2, i3}, {i2}, {i3},
and let P h2 : {i1, i2, i3}, {i2, i3}, {i1, i3}, {i3}, {i1, i2}, {i2}, {i1}. Let Pi1 = h2, h1, Pi2 = h1, h2,
and Pi3 = h1, h2. Finally, let q1 = q2 = 2, q′1 = q′2 = 1 be the possible capacities.
Assume that qhl = 1 for all l ≥ 3. Let PH be such that ij, j = 1, 2, 3 is not acceptable to
hl, l > 2 such that ij, j > 3 is not acceptable to h1 or to h2 and such that each ij, j > 3
is acceptable to at most one hospital. Let µ be the unique stable matching of the market(
H \ {h1, h2} , I \ {i1, i2, i3}, qH\{h1,h2}, PH\{h1,h2}, PI\{i1,i2,i3}
)
.
8While restrictive, this condition is nonetheless necessary for the GGCM to yield stable allocations.
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Let µ0 =
h1 h2 ∅
{i1} {i3} {i2}
, µ1 =
h1 h2
{i2} {i1,i3}
, µ2 =
h1 h2
{i1} {i2,i3}
,
µ3 =
h1 h2
{i1, i2} {i3}
, and µ4 =
h1 h2
{i2, i3} {i1}
. Then:
Γ(1, 1, qH\{h1,h2}) = {(µ0, µ)}, Γ(1, 2, qH\{h1,h2}) = {(µ1, µ) , (µ2, µ)},
Γ(2, 1, qH\{h1,h2}) = {(µ3, µ) , (µ4, µ)}, Γ(2, 2, qH\{h1,h2}) = {(µ4, µ)}.
We prove that for every family {Gq′}q′ of stable mechanisms, the generalized game of
capacity manipulation induced by {Gq′}q′ yields an unstable matching at some SPE when
the true capacity vector is (2, 2, qH\{h1,h2}).
Assume by contradiction that there is a family {Gq′}q′ of stable mechanisms such the
generalized game of capacity manipulation induced by {Gq′}q′ yields a selection of the stable
set in SPE for every q. When both capacities are equal to 2 the SPE outcome is (µ4, µ).
There are two possibilities: either the SPE yielding (µ4, µ) includes hospital h1 and h2 true
capacities or it does not.
From subgame perfection, it follows that when both hospitals have capacity 2, (µ4, µ)
must be the unique NE outcome of one of the following games or no such games can have
a pure strategy NE (without losing of generality we disregard the moves of hospitals hl, for
l ≥ 3:
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(1)
h1\h2 1 2
1 i1, i3 i2, {i1,i3}
2 {i2, i3}, i1 {i2, i3}, i1
, (2)
h1\h2 1 2
1 i1, i3 i1, {i2, i3}
2 {i2, i3}, i1 {i2, i3}, i1
,
(3)
h1\h2 1 2
1 i1, i3 i2, {i1,i3}
2 {i1, i2}, i3 {i2, i3}, i1
, (4)
h1\h2 1 2
1 i1, i3 i2, {i1,i3}
2 {i1, i2}, i3 {i2, i3}, i1
.
Where the table above presents the outcomes at matching µ4 as a result of the capacities
declared by h1 and h2. For example, µ4(h1 | (qh1 , qh2) = (1, 1)) = i1 , µ4(h1 | (qh1 , qh2) =
(1, 2)) = {i1,i3} and so on. Games (1) and (2) have (1, 2) as NE. Games (3) and (4) have
(2, 1) as NE. None of the NE yields µ4, which yields a contradiction.
However, if there are no simultaneous cycles, any such mechanisms implement the stable
allocations.
Proposition 8 Assume that the family of non-revelation mechanisms {Gq}q′≤q is stable.
Assume that the preferences of the agents P have no simultaneous cycles. Then every SPE
of the generalized game of capacity manipulation induced by {Gq}q′≤q yields the unique stable
matching of (H, I, q, P ).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the interaction between preference and capacity manipulation in
many-to-one matching markets. This interaction has been largely overlooked in the literature
and is relevant to determine the likelihood of finding stable allocations in these markets. We
first provide the necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee the stability of NE and
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the strategy-proofness of truthful capacity revelation under the hospital-optimal and the
intern-optimal stable rules. It turns out that the hospital-optimal rule is more prone to
capacity manipulation than the intern-optimal rule. This result is in line with Kojima and
Pathak (2008), who show how the intern-optimal rule leaves little room for manipulation in
large markets. Second, we study generalized games of capacity manipulation. A GGCM is
a multistage game where hospitals first state their capacities and then interns are assigned
to hospitals using a sequential mechanism. In the GGCM , the agents develop the full extent
of their strategic capabilities in a setting where both capacity and preference manipulation
are allowed. In this setting, we first present an impossibility result: none of the games can
implement stable allocations in a general domain. However, if we restrict the preference
domain, implementation becomes feasible. We show that the absence of simultaneous cycles
guarantees the stability of NE outcomes when the preferences of hospitals are known, i.e., in
a stable revelation mechanism. Furthermore, in the case of stable non-revelation mechanisms,
we find that there is no possibility of implementing stable matching, unless preferences are
acyclical.
The previous results in GGCM provide insight on the reasons why capacity manipulation
might hinder the implementability of stable matching in some markets. First, the choice of
the rule to be implemented is determinant. This is because the hospital-optimal rule favors
capacity manipulation. Moreover, the consequences of the previous choice differ depending
on whether the GGCM is designed with a revelation or a non-revelation mechanism.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let q be a NE when the capacity vector is q∗ and let µ = ϕV (q)
be the matching outcome. Assume µ is unstable in (H, I, q∗, P ). Let (h, j) ∈ H × I be a
hospital-intern pair blocking µ and set µ∗ = ϕV (q∗h, q−h). We next prove that µ (h)Phµ∗ (h).
We already know that µ (h)Rhµ∗ (h) because q is a NE.
First, notice that qh < q∗h and |µ (h)| = qh, otherwise (h, j) would block µ in (H, I, q, P ).
Consider the related one-to-one matching market. Let h′c denote a copy of hospital h′ ∈ H
in that market. From Proposition 2 in Gale and Sotomayor (1985a) it follows that µ∗RIµ
and µ (h′c)Rhcµ∗ (h′c) for every h′ ,= h and µ (hc)Rhµ∗ (hc) for every hc such that µ (hc) ,=
hc. Furthermore, µ (h)Rhµ∗ (h) because q is a NE and µ ,= µ∗ because µ is unstable in
(H, I, (q∗h, q−h) , P ). Thus, µPHµ∗ and µ∗PIµ. Finally, µ (h)Phµ∗ (h), otherwise (h, j) would
block µ in (H, I, q, P ). !
Proof of Lemma 2: Let q be a vector of capacities. Let h ∈ H. Let qh < q∗h and let q−h
be the vector of capacities for the other hospitals. Set µ = ϕV (q) and set µ∗ = ϕV (q∗h, q−h).
We prove that if µ (h)Phµ∗ (h), then a simultaneous cycle exists. Proposition 2 in Gale and
Sotomayor (1985a) (applied to the related one-to-one matching market) implies that µ∗PIµ
and µPHµ∗. More precisely, it implies that iPh′j for all h′ such that µ (h′) ,= µ∗ (h′), for
all i ∈ µ (h′) \ µ∗ (h′) and for all j ∈ µ∗ (h′) \ µ (h′). Set I ′ = {i : µ∗ (i)Piµ (i)} ,= Ø. Let
h0 ∈ µ (I ′), then µ (h0)Ph0µ∗ (h0) and set i0 = maxPh0µ (h0)\µ∗ (h0), i0 ∈ I ′. For all l ≥ 1, set
hl+1 = µ∗ (il) if hl+1 ,= ht for every t < l+1 and set hl+1 = hl otherwise. Observe that h0 ,= h1.
Let il = maxPhl−1µ (hl−1)\ (µ∗ (hl−1) ∪ {i0, ..., il−1}) if µ∗ (hl−1)∪{i1, ..., il−1} # µ (hl−1), and
set il+1 = il otherwise. The sequence is stationary because I ′ is finite. Let l¯ be the minimal
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number l ≥ 1 such that hl = hl+1. Let k be such that hk = hl. Set jl = il+k and rl = hl+k
for every l ≤ l − k. The sequence satisfies µ (jl) = hl = µ∗ (jl−1) for 1 ≤ l ≤ l − k − 1, and
µ∗ (jl¯−k) = r0 = µ (j0). We have: (1) jlPrljl+1 for all 1 ≤ l ≤ l− k and j0Pr0jl¯−k; (2) rl+1Pjlrl
for all 0 ≤ l ≤ l − k − 1 and r0Pjl¯−kjl¯−k. Thus, h0, ..., hk, r0, ..., rk constitute a simultaneous
cycle. !
Proof of Proposition 1: (1) From Proposition 1 in Romero-Medina and Triossi (2011)
it follows that if P has no simultaneous cycles, the set of stable matchings is a singleton for
every q, and the claim holds for every stable rule ϕ.
(2) From (1) a NE yielding a stable matching exists. From Lemma 1 and (1) the game does
not yield unstable matchings at equilibrium. The rest of the claim follows from Proposition
1 in Romero-Medina and Triossi (2011), which shows that if there are no simultaneous cycles
the set of stable matchings is a singleton. !
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume that there is a hospitals’ cycle. Let h0, ..., hT and
i0, i1, ..., iT be defined as in Definition 1. We define a preference profile for the interns as
follows. Let hl+1Pilhl and A (il) = {hl, hl+1} for l = 0, ..., T . Let P I\{i0,...,iT } be any vector of
preferences. Consider the market
(
H \ {h0, ..., hT} , I \ {i0, ..., iT} , q−{h0,...,hT }, PH\{h0,...,hT }, P I′\{i0,...,iT }
)
and let µ′ be the hospital-optimal stable matching. Let PI\{i0,...,iT } such that A (i) = µ(i)
for every i ∈ I. When qhl = 2 for l = 0, ..., T , the market (H, I, q, P ) has a unique stable
matching: µ (i) = µ′ (i) for every i ∈ I ′ \ {i0, ..., iT} and µ (il) = hl+1, for l = 0, ..., T . It is
easy to see that when q =
(
2, ..., 2, q−{h0,...,hT }
)
, the message
(
1, ..., 1, q−{h0,...,hT }
)
is a NE.
The matching outcome is µ∗, where µ∗ (i) = µ′ (i) for every i ∈ I ′ \ {i0, ..., iT} i ,= i1, i2,
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µ∗ (il) = hl+1, for l = 0, ..., T . The matching µ∗ is blocked by (h2, i1).
The proof of the remainder of the claim is identical and thus omitted. !
Proof of Proposition 3: Claim (1). Let h ∈ H. Let qh < q∗h and let q−h be a vector of
capacities for hospitals other than h. Set µ = ϕI (q) and µ∗ = ϕI (q∗h, q−h). We prove that if
µ (h)Phµ∗ (h), a non-monotonic cycle exists. Proposition 2 in Gale and Sotomayor (1985b),
applied to the related one-to-one market, implies that for every h′ ∈ H and i, j ∈ I such
that i ∈ µ (h′) \ µ∗ (h′), j ∈ µ∗ (h′) \ µ (h′) we have iPh′j. From µ (h)Phµ∗ (h) it follows that
µPHµ∗. Proposition 2 in Gale and Sotomayor (1985b) also implies that µ∗P ∗I µ.
There is no loss of generality in assuming that µ∗ (i) is i’s favorite hospital, for every i ∈ I,
because µPHµ∗ and µ∗PIµ. Consider the deferred acceptance algorithm where interns apply
and the capacity vector is q. Let i be the first intern rejected by µ∗ (i) = h′. When i is
rejected, hospital h′ has all its qh′ positions filled; hence i is rejected in favor of an intern
in µ∗ (h′). It follows that |µ (h′)| < |µ∗ (h′)| and h = h′, thus the preferences of h are not
monotonic.
Set M = µ (h) and M ′ =µ∗ (h). Let M \M ′ = {i1, ..., is} and M ′ \M = {j1, ..., jq} . Set
r = |M ′| −| M | . It has been assumed that µ∗ (i) is i’s favorite hospital. Remember that
MPhM ′ . Consider the deferred acceptance algorithm where interns apply to hospitals and
the capacity vector is q, which leads to µ. For every i ∈ I, intern i applies to µ∗ (i) in the
first stage of the deferred acceptance algorithm leading to µ. It must be the case that exactly
r interns are rejected by h in the first stage of the deferred acceptance algorithm.
The remainder of the proof of Claim (1) is divided into two parts, where we find the elements
of the non-monotonic cycles at h that appear in Definition 5, separately
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(a) First, we find it−1, as in Definition 5, using the following algorithm.
Step 1. Consider i1. Let d0 > 1 be the stage of the deferred acceptance algorithm leading
to µ where i1 has been accepted by h, and let w1 ∈ I be an intern that has been rejected
by h in favor of i1. If w1 ∈ M ′, stop and set i1−1 = w1, otherwise at step d1, 1 < d1 < d0,
w1 has been accepted and an intern w2 has been rejected in favor of w1. For all k ≥ 2, if
wk ∈ M ′, stop and set i1−1 = wk, otherwise at step dk, 1 < dk < dk−1, wk has been accepted
by h and an intern wk+1 has been rejected by h in favor of wk. The sequence eventually stops
at a wK1 ∈ M ′ who has been rejected by h in a step dK1 > 1 of the deferred acceptance
algorithm.9 Set i1−1 = wK1 and W 1 = {w1, ..., wK1}. Notice that i1−1 belongs to M ′ \M .
There is no loss of generality in assuming that i1−1 = j1. We have i1Phj1.
Step t. 2 ≤ t ≤ s. Let d0 > 1 be the stage of the deferred acceptance algorithm leading to µ
where it has been accepted by h and let w1 ∈ I \
⋃t−1
l=1W
l be an intern that has been rejected
by h in favor of it. This is possible because if a number of interns are accepted by a college h¯
at the same stage t > 1 of the deferred acceptance algorithm, the same number of interns who
were previously employed at h¯ are rejected. If w1 ∈ M ′, stop and set it−1 = w1, otherwise
at step d1, 1 < d1 < d0, w1 has been accepted and an intern w2 ∈ I \
⋃t−1
l=1W
l has been
rejected in favor of w1. For all k ≥ 2, if wk ∈M ′, stop and set it−1 = wk, otherwise at step dk,
1 < dk < dk−1, wk has been accepted by h and an intern wk+1 has been rejected by h in favor
of wk. The sequence eventually stops at some wKt ∈M ′ who has been rejected by h in a step
dKt > 1 of the deferred acceptance algorithm.10 Set it−1 = wKt and set W t = {w1, ..., wKt}.
Notice that it−1 belongs to M ′ \M . There is no loss of generality in assuming that it−1 = jt.
We have itPhjt.
9Every intern in the sequence is rejected because of the arrival of an application from another intern.
10See footnote 9.
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By construction it−1 ,= il−1 for l ,= t.
(b) Next, for every k = 1, ..., s we find the hk0, ..., hkTk , i
k
0, i
k
1, ..., i
k
Tk from Definition 5 and con-
clude.
For k = 1, ..., s set ik0 = ik.
Step 1.k. Let ik1 be the intern in favor of which ik0 has been rejected by µ∗
(
ik0
)
= hk1.
Step t.k, t ≥ 2. At a stage dt of the deferred acceptance algorithm leading to µ, ikt has been re-
jected by hkp+1 = µ∗
(
ikt
) ,= hkt in favor of an intern ikt+1 /∈ µ∗ (hkt ). If hkt = hk′l and dkt = dk′l for
some k′ < k and for some l, hkt has received at least∣∣{k′ < k : hkt = hk′l for some l and dkt = dk′l }∣∣ + 1 applications that are better than ikt . Hence
we can choose a ikt that is different from every other ik
′
l , 0 ≤ k′ < k. We have hkt+1 = µ∗
(
ikt
)
for all k, iktPhkt+1i
k
t+1 and hkt+1Pikt h
k
t .11 The sequence stops at a T k where hkTk = h rejects some
interns in the first stage of the algorithm. By (a), ik0Phik−1PhikTk . Therefore, there is a hospital
h ∈ H and M,M ′ subsets of interns, that satisfy |M | < |M ′|, MPhM ′ and generalized cycles
hk0, ..., h
k
Tk , i
k
−1, i
k
0, i
k
1, ..., i
k
Tk with T
k ≥ 1 such that h = hk0 and ik = ik0 where ik−1, ikTk ∈M ′ \M
and ik−1 ,= ik′−1, for k ,= k′. Therefore, there is a non-monotonic cycle at h.
Claim (2). By Claim (1) there exists a NE that yields a stable matching. By Lemma 1 there
are no unstable equilibria; hence every equilibrium outcome is stable. By contradiction, as-
sume that the outcome is not the intern-optimal stable matching. It must be the case that
some hospital has misrepresented its true capacity. Let q be a NE of the game and q∗ ≥ q
be the true capacity vector. Set µ = ϕI (q) and µ∗ = ϕI (q∗). From Claim (1) µ is stable in
(H, I, q∗, P ), so µPHµ∗ and µ∗PIµ. There is no loss of generality in assuming that µ∗ (i) is
intern i’s favorite hospital. The matching µ is obtained through the intern-optimal deferred
11Because ikp first applies to hkp+1in the deferred acceptance algorithm.
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acceptance algorithm. It must be the case that at least one i is rejected by µ∗ (i) = h in the
first stage of the deferred acceptance algorithm. Every intern applies to her hospital under
µ∗ at this stage because h has misrepresented its true capacity. Hence h has fewer interns
under µ than under µ∗. This yields a contradiction because both matchings are stable in
(H, I, q∗, P ). !
Proof of Proposition 4: Assume that there is a non-monotonic cycle at h. Using the
notation from Definition 5, let I ′ =
{
i1Tk : h
k
l = h
}∩M ′∪{i1−1, ..., is−1}. SetM∗ = M ′∩M∪I ′.
Notice that |M ′| > |M | and MPhM ′. Set the preferences of the interns as follows. Let
A
(
ikl
)
=
{
hkl , h
k
l+1
}
and hkl+1Phkhkl for all k and all l. Let A (i) = {h} if i ∈ M ′ ∩M . For
all other interns, let A (i) = {h (i)} for a hospital h (i) /∈ {hkl : k = 1, ..., s; l = 1, ..., T k} . Let
qh0 = qh =
∣∣M*∣∣ and q = 1 for all k, l such that hkl ,= h. Set all other capacities arbitrarily.
We have ϕIh (q) = M∗. From the property of the non-monotonic cycle at h, we know that
ϕIh (q
′
h, q−h)RhMPhM
∗. Let q′h be h’s best response to q−h. We have q′h < qh. It is easy to
see that (q′h, q−h) is a NE at (H, I, q, P ). It yields a matching that is unstable because in
any stable matching of (H, I, q, P ) h is matched to |M∗| > q′h interns. !
Proof of Proposition 5: When the intern-optimal rule is used the revelation of true pref-
erences is a dominant strategy for interns. From Proposition 3 we have ϕI (qh, q−h, P ) (h)RhϕI (q′h, q−h, P ) (h)
for all q′h, qh such that q′h ≤ qh and for all h. Thus, to complete the proof of the claim it
suffices to show that ϕI (q, PH , PI) (h)RhϕI (q, P ′h, P−h, PI) (h) for all q, and P ′h as well as
for all h if the preferences of the interns are acyclical. But this follows from Lemma 3 in
Romero-Medina and Triossi (2011). !
Proof of Proposition 6: The claim follows from Theorem 1 on Sotomayor (2008) (pp.
30
631-632) and Proposition 1. !
Proof of Proposition 8: The claim follows from Proposition 1. !
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